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(NON)RELIGIOUSNESS IN SLOVENIA 
by Niko To~ 
Dr. Niko Tos is professor at the School of Social Science at the University of 
Ljubljana. He and several of his colleagues undertook the first public opinion polls 
in Slovenia (which was at that time a republic in Yugoslavia). This paper was 
prepared for a conference in Spain held in September 1993 but is the first appearance 
of this material in English. 
Introduction 
Systematic empirical sociological research into religiousness and attitudes towards the 
church has been conducted in Slovenia since the mid-Sixties. However it was only after the 
establishment of Slovenian state independence (June 1991) that researchers were able to join 
two major international projects investigating the phenomenon of religion in the 
contemporary world, namely the World Values Survey (WVS)1 and the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP). 2 The present text first briefly describes circumstances in Slovenia, 
from the end of the Second World War to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which determined 
the status of believers and the relationship between church and state, then reviews the 
findings of sociological research into religiousness carried out over the period 1968-1990, and 
presents the religion section of the WVS compared with the findings of ISSP, Religion 1991. 
1. Slovenia prior to the WVS enquiry 0991) 
1 World Values Survey (WVS), Professor Ronald lngelhart, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA. A national survey of a representative sample 
(N=1028) was conducted in February 1992 by the Research Institute of the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Ljubljana (RI FSS), under the author's leadership. 
2ISSP, Programme 1991, Religion. A national survey of a representative sample (N=2080) 
was conducted in November 1991 by the RI SSF in the framework of the project Slovenian 
Public Opinion which has been underway in Slovenia in similar way to the GSS (USA) or 
ALLBUS (Germany) since 1968 under the author's leadership. 
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Slovenia in Yugoslavia and independence. The WVS 1991 and ISSP, Religion 1991 
inquiries took place at a crucial point in Slovenian history, directly after the first democratic 
elections (April 1990) and following the country's achievement of independence. Previously 
Slovenia had been a part of the federal Yugoslav state. Its 45-year postwar development had 
been characterized by a dominant ideology which underpinned all societal, economic and 
social relations, and a single political party which autonomously ruled on all ideological issues 
and at the same time held total control of the army, police, economy, mass media, as well as 
educational institutions and the church. The everyday state of affairs in postwar Yugoslavia-
-notwithstanding the original concepts of self -management socialism and federalism--in 
essence comprised all the components of Friedrich's definition of totalitarianism (Friedrich, 
Brzezinski, 1956). This is not to overlook of course all the distinctive features and 
divergencies in Slovenia's development inside this essentially totalitarian skeleton. In the 
wake of state independence in 1991 Slovenia is attempting to establish itself as a democratic 
society through a plurality of political parties, the reinstitution of private property and a 
market economy, the welfare state. It is shaping itself anew; a new democratic institutional 
political system is arising with the germ of new social structures and new political practice. 
The situation is marked further by an economic and social crisis which is expressed partly 
as a crisis of values. 
Although observing the situation in Slovenia over the past decades has constantly 
encouraged consideration and characterization of the differences and peculiarities in its 
development compared with the rest of Yugoslavia and other East bloc countries, there is no 
doubt that the revolution was made possible by the collapse of the so-called socialist systems 
and the profound political, economic and cultural crisis of Yugoslav federalism. Slovenia, 
along with the other Central and East European formerly Communist countries was caught 
up in the third wave of democratization following the Second World War. The first wave 
encompassed the pacified states--the Axis Powers; the second mainly ecompassed the 
Romance and Latin Amedcan countries, and in Europe, Spain, Portugal as well as Greece; 
the present, third wave encompasses the entire European part of the former East bloc. The 
course of transformation of these countries and their capacity to establish democratic 
institutions and political relations is determined by the intersection and sources of certain 
tensions or conflict relations, namely: (a) the redefinition of the nation or the nation state, 
with all the ramifications that this process of redefinition generates and that influence the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. An important part is played in these processes by 
the so-called national churches as they break out of their marginalization during communist 
rule. The churches are in renewal, gaining importance as a factor in awakening national 
consciousness, and hence as a political factor as well. This is demonstrated by the situation 
in Russia, Croatia, in Serbia, and in Poland throughout, (b) the question of the relationship 
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between democratic institutions and the economic restructuring of society (Bruszt, Janos, 
1992), and (c) the eradication of the Communist parties' ideological monopoly while at the 
same time preventing the emergence of others. 
The collapse of the East European Communist systems then has quite obviously been 
marked by a redefinition of the nation and the nation state. In Yugoslavia this striving to 
redefine the position of one nation at the expense of others, and in particular a more 
powerful one inside a federal system, displays all its destructive might. But the redefinition 
of a nation state may--in contrast to the foregoing--also prove a significant impulse for the 
development of democratic institutions. Considering the current situation in Slovenia and the 
changes already forged, it may be stated that issues related to national constituting have not 
been at the forefront since international recognition was achieved (Tos, 1992). In the initial 
period following the revolution the process of constituting a national state creates an ap-
propriate environment and stimulus for the establishment (nominally) of a democratic 
institutional system. In Slovenia the church did not have a dominant role in these processes, 
but it did finally escape the marginal position it was assigned after the Second World War.3 
The position of the church in Slovenia in this period is determined by certain essential 
circumstances and factors (Roter, 1993): 
(a) From the time of Christianization and the Slovenes' settlement to the present-day, the 
leading ecclesiastical institution has been the Roman Catholic Church which has decisively 
influenced the development of the national culture and policies of the Slovenes down the 
centuries. 
(b) During the Reformation, Protestantism gained sway in Slovenia particularly in the 
towns and was forcibly eradicated by the Catholic Church during the Counter Reformation. 
Today the proportion of Protestants in Slovenia is negligibly low and restricted primarily to 
the border area near Hungary. 
(c) During the Second World War, when Slovenia was occupied and annexed partly by the 
German Reich and partly by Fascist Italy and Hungary, the Roman Catholic Church did not 
join the mass Partisan resistance movement, the National Liberation Front, which was led by 
the Communist Party; instead it aligned with the anti-communist movement which arose 
during the war under the patronage of the occupation forces. In contrast to the Polish 
Catholic Church, which was a pillar of the resistance, the Slovenian Church is characterized 
more by collaborationism. 
3 For more, v: Nationalities Papers, Voice from the Slovene Nation, N.Y. 1993, Vol 
XXI/I. 
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(d) In the postwar years the Catholic Church was persecuted in Slovenia; its property was 
expropriated on the charge of collaboration; priests were also persecuted. The Church took 
a negative stand towards the postwar regime which carried out a forcible agrarian reform, 
nationalization, established one-party (communist) rule and the constitutional separation of 
church and state. Subsequently (from the end of the 1960s) relations between church and the 
state were gradually normalized (re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Holy See, 
renovation of churches with state assistance, the religious press and religious celebrations 
were permitted, etc.) and finally formally regulated in the new Slovenian Constitution which 
posits the freedom of confession, the social and spiritual role of the church, and maintains 
the principle of separation of church and state. 
(e) Empirical sociological research since 1968 has shown that relative freedom of 
confession nevertheless was obtained in Slovenia in the four postwar decades. A large part 
of the population preserved and renewed their religious orientation as well as their ties to the 
Catholic Church (more on this below). Conditions for preserving and renewing religiousness 
were substantially more favourable in Slovenia than in most East European communist states, 
particularly the extreme cases of East Germany and Albania. 
2. Surveys of religiousness in Slovenia. 1968-1990 
In presenting the state of religiousness or unreligiousness in Slovenia in the period 1968-
1990, we may draw on a series of investigations in the context of the Slovene Public Opinion 
(SP0)4 project which has been under way since 1968. It is based on a representative sample 
of the adult population of Slovenia and has regularly included religiological aspects. At the 
very beginning of the survey (1968) the typology of dimensions of religiousness developed 
included the variable (non- )religiousness and at the same time recorded frequency of 
attendance . at religious ceremonies. Thus operationalization includes the dichotomized 
dimension: religious-unreligious and the dimension of devoutness, expressed through 
frequency of religious attendance. The typology includes 9 categories, namely: (1) religious-
-consistently devout (believers who attend services every Sunday or more often), (2) religious 
--inconsistently devout (religious, who frequently attend services), (3) religious--
indifferently devout (religious, who only occasionally attend and then major religious 
services), (4) religious--undevout (religious, do not attend religious services), (5) undecided-
-devout (do not know whether they are religious or not, nevertheless attend religious 
4 This survey has been under way since 1968 in the framework of the Center for Public 
Opinion and Mass Communications Surveys and the Research Institute of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. 
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services), (6) undecided--devout (do not know whether they are religious or not, nevertheless 
do not attend religious services), (7) unreligious--inconsistent (not religious, but occasionally 
attend religious services), (8) unreligious--consistent (are not religious and do not attend 
religious services), (9) all others. 
The usefulness of this operationalization stems from the fact that Slovenia is in effect a 
mono-religious region where the Roman Catholic Church dominates absolutely, such as in 
Austria, Italy, Spain, etc. 
TABLE 1: (Non-)Religiousness and attendance at religious 
services by the Slovenian population, 1968-1992* 
1- I am religious and regularly attend 
religious services every Sunday 
2- I am religious and often, at least once 
a month, attend religious services 
3· I am religious and only sometimes, on 
major holy days and special occasions 
attend religious services 
4- I am religious and do not attend 
religious services 
5- I cannot say whether I am religious or not, 
although I attend religious services 
6- I cannot say whether I am religious or not, 
and I do not attend religious services 
7- I am not religious, although I attend 
religious services 
8- I am not religious and do not attend 
religious services 
9- I cannot answer 
1968 
21.7 
10.3 
23.2 
12.6 
3.7 
25.9 
2.6 
1973 
17.7 
10.4 
23.2 
8.1 
3.3 
5.1 
1.6 
28.2 
2.4 
1978 
11.8 
8.7 
20.1 
4.7 
2.4 
7.8 
2.7 
40.1 
1.7 
1983 
11.0 
9.0 
21.9 
5.8 
4.5 
6.9 
3.0 
35.6 
2.3 
1988 
12.4 
9.3 
28.3 
6.3 
3.9 
7.3 
2.8 
27.9 
1.8 
1990 
13.0 
10.2 
31.2 
7.4 
3.5 
6.3 
2.7 
23.6 
2.1 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(2475) (2098) (2064) (2067) (2075) (2074) 
Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana 
*Besides those shown, data is also available for the years 1969, 
1971, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989. 
The situation at the first measurement on the religiousness dimension (Table I, 1968) 
shows that a good two-thirds of the population expresses belief, yet only a poor half of these 
show adequate ties to the church in terms of regular or frequent attendance at religious 
ceremonies; the remaining one-third of the population is unreligious and only insignificantly 
tied to the church. The data obtained on (un)religiousness and (un)devoutness may be 
interpreted as 'normal' for Slovenia's European (predominantly Catholic) environs at that 
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time. The decades-long ideological indoctrination which denied and attacked the human, 
social, and cultural essence of religion and the church as a reactionary social force did not 
substantially affect the extent and intensity of religious commitment. As a consequence of 
the insularity of the state (Yugoslavia) and lags in the process of its industrialization and 
urbanization which were proceeding intensively in West Europe at the time, there had been 
a hold-up in the process of secularization. But· it intensified with the liberalization of· 
political relations in the Sixties and the opening of the borders to migratory flows. This is 
illustrated well by the data for 1968-1978 in Table 1. The proportion of the religious 
'devoted' to the church (regular attendance at church services) declined by almost a half; 
there was a slight rise in the proportion of the· religiously undecided and a substantial 
increase (from 26% to 40%) in the proportion of unreligious. In the Slovenian literature 
precisely, this period is labelled a period of intensive secularization. It was not just a matter 
of a decline in religiousness in general but also of weakening ties to the church. Thus, a 
Slovene Catholic theologian (Rajhman, 1979) observes that for the Slovenes the epithet 'a 
Catholic people' is more a reminder of the former glory of the Church and its organizational 
apparatus, that the Catholic Church has to say goodbye to this epithet because the process of 
secularization is so strong, and the sociological situation in Slovenia does not differ from that 
in modern industrial countries. A similar fall in attendance at religious services has been 
found in surveys in Austria (Zulehner, 1991, p.126). Thus. the proportion of regular and 
frequent attendance in 1968 reached about 34% in Austria compared with 32% in Slovenia 
where, however, the downtrend was more intensive, and by 1978, it had reached just 20.5% 
and remained at a level of 20% in 1983. Nevertheless the secularization process or trend was 
a phenomenon limited to the Seventies. When the cross-section 1978-1988 and later 
measurements are compared it may be observed (Roter, 1989, p. 93) that in Slovene society 
"certain noteworthy changes have taken place: the halting of the secularization trend which 
is evident in a perceptible rise in the proportion of believers and a marked drop in the 
proportion of non-believers." The proportion of those regularly attending services remained 
at a low level ( 11% - 13% ), although the proportion of those occasionally attending rose 
substantially in that period: from 34% in 1978 to 44% in 1988 and 48% in 1990 (see Table 2). 
Yet the secularization trend from the previous period had not waned entirely. The province 
of church and religion somehow functioned more freely, less bindingly and more openly. 
TABLE 2: Attendance at church services by the population of 
Slovenia, 1968-1992 
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1990 1992 
wvs 
- regularly (1x weekly or more) 21.7 17.7 11 .• 8 11.0 12.4 13.0 22.7 
- occasionally (less than 1x weekly) 37.2 38.5 33.8 38.4 44.3 47.6 41.0 
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- does not attend 
- others 41.1 43.8 54.4 50.6 43.3 39.4 36.3 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(2475) (2098) (2064) (2067) (2075) (2074) (1035) 
Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana 
The findings of the surveys in the first decade (1968-1978) clearly show a deterioration 
in the position of religion and hence a clear secularization trend, which was then followed 
in the next period (I 978-1988) by a trend to religious revival. This trend is also confirmed 
in the 1988-1992 period (see Table 3). A comparison of the data for 1968/1973 and 
1988/1992 shows that Slovene religiousness 'revived' and that the differences were only in 
nuances: there were fewer unreligious, fewer religious; there were substantially more 
undecided. The question arises, what caused the 'glacial period' in religious confession from 
the end of the Seventies to the mid-Eighties? In that period totalitarian ideological control 
in former Yugoslavia and Slovenia eased; matters concerning relations between the Catholic 
Church and the state were gradually set in order; a critical cultural and political public was 
taking shape which gave rise in the latter half of the Eighties to a multitude of social 
movements, with democratization of the system and the first pluralistic elections. At the same 
time in both Yugoslavia and Slovenia there was then a growing ideological, systemic and 
especially economic crisis; nationalism and ideas of independence were on the rise. This 
'freezing' of religiousness most probably had some inner cause and was not some delayed 
expression of European secularization trends. 
TABLE 3: Declarations of religiousness by the population of 
Slovenia, 1968-1991 
1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 
- religious "67.8 66.4 45.3 47.7 56.3 
- unrel igious 29.6 29.8 42.8 38.6 30.7 
- undecided 2.6 10.8 11.9 13.7 13.0 
1990 1992 
INS 
60.7 60.2 
26.3 23.2 
13.0 17.7 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(2475) (2098) (2064) (2067) (2075) (2074) (1035) 
Source: SPO, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana 
Naturally research in the past period has not been limited to merely determining 
religiousness and devoutness but also dealt with the question of the conformity of individual 
religious convictions and values to church teachings, the question of the position of faith and 
believers in the church and society, and especially the question of the church as an institution 
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and its position in society and the state order and in connection with the desired relationship 
between church and politics. 
The findings show that both the general European and the Slovene secularization trend 
is evident above all in the relationship between individual belief and values and church 
teachings, the way the role of the church as an institution is understood, and how the 
relationship between church and politics is viewed. We present the degree of (non-) 
conformity between individual religious convictions, beliefs and values, and church 
teachings, on the basis of the values survey (WVS, 1991 ). The secularization trend evinced 
as a high degree of disparity between individual beliefs and values and church teachings is 
present throughout. Thus for example Roter (1989, p.93) concludes from the survey that "in 
terms of the so-called dissolution of dogmatic belief the secularization effects of the 
preceding period are still operative and evident in the ever-perceptible gap between the at-
titudes of believers and doctrinal church dogma, although within the group of devoutly 
religious there is an increasing degree of conformity between religious convictions and 
church teachings." This conformity, then, is more and more a 'privilege' of the relatively 
narrow category of believers classified as devoutly religious in our system or 'kirchlich' by 
Zulehner (1991, p.126). In the other groups it is low or entirely absent. 
A kind of secularization trend, which is not waning, is therefore expressed in a new 
freedom, openness, and optional relationship between the person and the church and religious 
teachings. This flexiblity is evident not only in the attitude of the religious towards religion 
and the church but also in that of the non-religious. Sectarian rejection of religion and the 
church (1969: 22.8%) has almost completely faded today (1990: 4.4%). Characteristic of 
Slovenia in the Eighties then is a highly predominant acceptance of the legitimacy of faith 
and the church and the rules of conduct and values that it lays down. At the same time there 
is increasing acceptance of the role of the church not just as a religious teacher or guardian 
of religious rites and the follower's morals but in the humanitarian and charitable domain, 
as well as the educational (religious). 
The impact of secularization is seen from attitudes towards the relationship between 
church and politics and the position of the church in the state: in the Eighties, religious and 
unreligious Slovenes strongly rejected the possibility of the church adopting political 
standpoints and encouraging the political activity of its followers (1962: 66%; 1990: 79%). 
This predominant predilection is finally also shown in attitudes towards the new Constitution 
(1991) for 71% of the population supported the constitutional rule of separation of church 
and state and only 18% of respondents rejected it. 
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These are only some of the aspects of empirical study of religion in Slovenia. 5 
3. Slovenia's inclusion in the first international survey - ISSP. Religion 1991 
ISSP, Religion 1991 is the widest empirical survey so far in the field of the sociology of 
religion which was conducted in Slovenia as well as 13 other European countries, the USA, 
Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and the Phillipines. The results of the Slovenian part has been 
described in part by Roter ( 1992, pp. 39-46), while the first comparative analyses have been 
made by Greeley of NORC, University of Chicago. From his preliminary analysis of the data 
from the Slovenian part of the survey Roter confirms his thesis about "the crisis in 
secularization processes" in Slovenia and the religious revival and at the same the limited 
impact of church teachings on secular attitudes and values. Greely observes on the basis of 
the overall comparative picture and preliminary analyses that although the data does not 
indicate ideal conformity with religious orthodoxy or religious practices, it does not indicate 
that faith has ceased to be important for the majority in the countries studied. In his view 
the "persistence of faith" is shown by the fact that the majority in these countries believe in 
God. And this holds for Slovenia as well. 
With regard to the three former socialist countries included in the survey Greely 
concludes that religion is reviving in them. Faith is increasing in Slovenia and East Germany, 
and in Hungary church attendance is growing. East Germany is the only unreligious country 
amongst those studied. He groups Slovenia with New Zealand, Norway, Britain, and West 
Germany in terms of religiousness, while the United States of America, Italy, and Ireland 
deviate strongly upwards. 
In the countries with the highest level of faith there is also a high level of personal 
happiness. Of the fifteen countries surveyed (WVS) Slovenia and Hungary rank at the bottom 
with the lowest measured personal happiness. At the same time Slovenia shows an above-
average level of superstition, and rates high (60% above the factor average) on Greely's 
"magic factor" composed of four "animistic" variables. Subsequent analysis may explain how 
low subjective happiness and high superstition (expressed by the religious and unreligious) 
go together with a relatively high level of unreligious in the same population. Are the 
relatively low faith and high superstitiousness related to the constant repetition of threats and 
5 Most of the surveys in this period were conducted in the framework of the Centre for 
the Study of Religion and the Church, or the Center for Public Opinion and Mass 
Communications Research of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana; recently 
surveys in the field of pastoral sociology have begun to be conducted in the framework of 
the Theology Faculty, University of Ljubljana. 
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risks that have confronted the Slovenes down the centuries (and especially the last few 
decades) at the crossroads of different systems, cultures and traditions, and particularly as 
the nation sets out on the road of national independence and has no control over external 
factors? I end this thought with Greeley's reference to recent studies of magic practices in 
African and Asian societies which suggest that their fundamental purpose is to reduce 
anxiety; one does not need magic when fishing in the lagoon; one needs it when venturing 
into the open seas. Belief in magic rises with fatalism and nihilism and is highest amongst 
those who are both nihilists and fatalists. Our research to date has not shown the average 
Slovene to be fatalistic or nihilistic. Is the high level of superstition found an artefact? Should 
different explanations be sought? Or do we still not know enough, on the basis of the surveys 
made, about the beliefs and values of the Slovenes? It must also be noted that Greeley ranks 
West Germany and Great Britain close to Slovenia on the magic factor. He goes on to 
consider atheism and concludes that in the contemporary world this is more a question of 
"believing atheism," which is also true for Slovenia where atheists subscribe to various forms 
of belief or superstitions. Thus for example 38% of Slovenian atheists believe in astrology, 
as in West Germany (32%). 
This comparative analysis of ISSP, Religion 1991 deals in particular with the position of 
religion in the former socialist countries. Greeley speaks of a resurgence of hope related to 
the fall of socialism when he analyses the circumstances determining faith in Slovenia, 
Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. He wonders why faith declined so steeply in East 
Germany and not in Slovenia or Hungary. In Slovenia 11% of the population has no religious 
affiliation, in Hungary 5%, and in East Germany 65%. He attributes the differences to East 
Germany's traditional Protestantism and the fact that it did not have a powerful Catholic 
Church, to its especially severe ideological indoctrination and regime, and to the fact that the 
fall of religion was taken more literally than in other socialist countries. 
My own impression from a review of the code book of the international survey is that 
in respect of religiousness, intensity and extent of belief, evaluation of the position of the 
church, and the influence of church teachings on attitudes and values, Slovenia tends to form 
a group with West Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Austria. In devoutness and 
values Slovenia differs strongly from the United States of America, Ireland, and Italy. In 
view of this it may be said that although it is located in Central Europe, Slovenia belongs 
more to the West European cultural-civilizational fold. 
4. World Value Survey - Slovenia Survey 1992 
Participation in the World Value Survey through the survey conducted in Slovenia in 
February 1992 brought the sociology of religion in this country new possibilities for 
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describing and explaining the phenomenon of religiousness-unreligiousness, attitudes towards 
the church, and the influence of church teachings and rules on actual conduct and attitudes. 
Identification with religion and the church may be expressed by statements of religiousness, 
affiliation to a church or religious group, or by attending religious or church services. Table 
3 shows that the WVS found 60.2% of Slovenes are religious, 17.7% are undecided, and 23.2% 
are unreligious. Only a small part of the unreligious respondents (6.9% or a poor third) 
describe themselves as atheists. Another central dimension of religiousness in WVS analyses 
to date has been the concept of god. In the population surveyed 19.8% subscribed to a theistic 
concept of a "personal god,", 38.6% to a deistic concept of "some sort of spirit or life force;" 
17.2% were undecided on the question, 13.1% explicitly denied the existence of god or some 
kind of spirit or life force, and 11.3% did not respond to the question. Every concept of god 
is found amongst the subjectively religious, as well as the unreligious and the undecided; 
belief in a personal god however is restricted to the group of subjectively religious. 
An important variable included in the analysis was "frequency of attendance at religious 
services" and identification with a religious group or church. Trends in attendance at services 
in the period 1968-1992 have been presented in Table 2. In 1992 the proportion of regular 
attendees (22.7%) lagged behind the proportion of 'abstainers' (non-attenders~-36.3%) and 
occasional attendees (41.0%). Nevertheless 63.7% or two-thirds of the population of adult 
Slovenes observed attended religious services at least occasionally. It must be added here that 
the Slovene population is predominantly affiliated to the Catholic Church. Table 4 shows that 
in the two consecutive surveys in 1992 approximately 70% declared an affiliation to the 
Roman Catholic Church; the proportions affiliated to the Protestant and the Orthodox Church 
and to Islam were insignificant, while 22% and 26% respectively declared no religious 
affiliation. In view of the data on faith, church attendance, and belief in a personal god, it 
is quite plain that identification with a religious group is part of cultural-civilizational 
tradition in Slovenia and as such does not directly indicate religiousness, although it does help 
in understanding .it. 
TABLE 4: Identification with a religious group, church, in 
Slovenia 
WVS 1992 SPO 1992 
(February) (Novenber) 
Roman Catholic Church 69.0 71.3 
Evangelical (Lutheran) Church 0.8 1.5 
Orthodox Church 1.1 2.4 
Other Christian Church 0.9 0.8 
Islam 1.5 2.1 
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None 26.7 
100% 
(1035) 
Source: RI FSS, University of Ljubljana 
21.9 
100% 
(2024) 
Typology of religiousness. Upon joining the two international projects (ISSP, Religion 1991 
and WVS 1991) we abandoned our own operationalization of the dimension of religiousness 
which had been grounded in the variables of belief (statement of religiousness or 
unreligiousness) and attendance at religious services (frequency). Amongst the various options 
open we elected the typology used in the European value survey and ·described by Zulehner 
(1991, pps 125-126). It employs a combination of the "concept of god" and "frequency of 
attendance at religious services" variables (WVS V 175 and V 147). By recoding and com-
bining the two variables we obtained 5 types of religiousnessjunreligiousness, namely: 
TYPE 
A - orthodox type (theistic, regular church attendance) 
B - traditional-church type (deistic, regular church attendance) 
C- religious type (theistic, occasional church attendance 
or abstinence) 
D - traditional-religious type (deistic, occasional or no 
church attendance) 
E- unreligious type (denial of the existence of god/spirit or 
undecided on the question, occasional or no church 
attendance) 
Share in % 
13.4 
14.5 
8.6 
18.2 
35.3 
100.0% (N=935)* 
* Total number surveyed is N=1035, 100 units were excluded from the classification. 
In assessing the usefulness of this social-religious typology (Zulehner, 1991) we drew on 
a comparison of the results of its application in the Austrian survey which yielded the 
following distribution: 15% orthodox, 9% traditional-church, 14% religious, 40% traditional-
religious, and 22% unreligious. The deviations in the Slovenian survey are small and expected 
because it had earlier been established that there are more unreligious and more abstainers 
from church services in Slovenia than in Austria. The findings from the first section that the 
Slovene population splits three ways in relation to religion and the church: a third are 
religious and devout, a third are religious and not devout, and a third are unreligious. This 
is confirmed in the main with the present typology: a good third (35.3%) are shown to be un-
religious; all the remainder (64.7%) are more (27.9%) or less (36.8%) tied to the church or 
religion. 
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Adoption of this social-religious typology in the analysis of the remaining indicators in 
the WVS questionnaire showed the following: 
(a) Indicators of religiousness. 
-Concept of god (V 135, V 138, V 140): 70% of the 'orthodox' agree with the statement-
Life is meaningful only because God exists; with the 'traditional-church' amd 'religious' 
agreement falls to 35% and 32%, with 'traditional religious' to 9%, and with 'unreligious' to 
5%. The picture is similar with the remaining statements. 
-Church affiliation (V 244--V 145). About 96% of 'orthodox' (type A) declare affiliation 
to the Roman Catholic Church (type B: 89%, type C:74%, typeD: 56%, type E: 55%). Thus 
as many as 55% of the unreligious declare their affiliation to the Roman Catholic Church. 
This confirms the above-mentioned conclusion that a statement of affiliation to a church or 
religious group is predominantly a matter of cultural-civilizational identification. Only 3% 
of the unreligious respondents identified themselves with another church, ;tnd the most 
outstanding option was no affiliation to any church (42%). There is a relatively high share 
of those declaring no church affiliation in the 'traditional-religious' group--type D (37%), 
and the religious--type C (19%). Amongst the 'orthodox' the share is quite negligible (2 
respondents). 
- Subjective belief (statement of religiousness--V 151). Of course all 'orthodox' type 
respondents are religious (type A: 98%, type B: 89%, type C: 84%, type D: 51%), a third of 
the 'unreligious' are subjectively religious, and two-fifths (40.6%) are unreligious or atheists, 
and a good quarter (26.4%) are undecided. There is a more substantial share of unreligious 
or atheists amongst the 'traditional-religious,' type D (26.1%) and the 'religious,' type C 
(I 1.3%), while there are none amongst the 'orthodox.' 
TABLE 5: Socio-religious typology and acceptance of religious 
teachings (in %) 
Believe in Total TYPE A TYPE B TYPE C TYPE D 
share Orthodox Tradit- Religious Tradit-
N=1035 ional- ional-
Church Relig-
ious 
- God 54.9 98.4 85.3 87.5 43.2 
- life after death 23.0 64,8 44.1 35.0 15.9 
- soul 37.4 81.6 61.8 52.5 38.6 
- devil 13.9 44.0 20.6 20.0 10.6 
- hell 14.4 47.2 23.5 21.3 9.5 
- heaven 25.0 n.o 38.2 43.8 13.6 
- sin 40.5 85.6 63.2 62.5 34.5 
- resurrection 18.1 64.8 36.6 26.3 6.4 
- reincarnation 12.4 27.2 14.0 16.3 17.0 
Type E 
Unrel-
igious 
23.9 
2.4 
9.1 
1.8 
2.1 
6.8 
14.2 
3.3 
3.6 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1035) (125) (136) (80) (264) (330) 
35 
Source: WVS, RI FSS, University of Ljubljana 
- Various components of faith (V 116-174). Table 5 shows how the respondents on 
average, and the various types, accept various components of the faith. Thus, belief in God 
(54.9%) is the most outstanding in the population as a whole, followed by belief in sin 
(40.5%), and belief in the soul (37.4%). The other components of faith are accepted by 
relatively small groups. Belief in God then is the central ingredient of religion or faith, which 
is confirmed by the 'orthodox' type which accepts this tenet completely (98.4%). Types Band 
Care only slightly behind, but belief in God drops strongly in typeD (traditional-religious -
43.2%) and to a poor quarter amongst the unreligious (Type E- 23.9%). Other components 
of belief common to types A, B, and C are belief in the soul and belief in sin, whereas all 
the other components (eg. life after death, heaven, resurrection from the dead) point to a 
type A - type B relationship. In the framework of the survey the 'orthodox' type A emerges 
as a completely independent category of orthodox religiousness. With respect to profundity 
and scope of belief it is a 'privileged' category. Next come types B and C which display 
great similarities, although type B is based on a deistic belief and regular church attendance 
and type Con theistic belief and occasional or non-attendance. Characteristic of both is that 
in effect they accept belief in god, in sin, and in the soul but strongly reject belief in rein-
carnation, the devil, and hell. The 'religious' type D (traditional-religious) constitutes an 
independent category which is characterized by unintensive, occasional, and arbitrary belief, 
with belief in god as the most outstanding (43.2%) followed by belief in the soul (38.6%) and 
belief in sin (34.5%). All the other components of belief are marginally represented in this 
type, particularly belief in resurrection from the dead (6.4%), in the devil and hell (about 
10%), in heaven (13.6%) etc. The 'unreligious', type E of course represents an independent 
category which partly expresses atheism. In this group a partial belief in god is expressed by 
a weak quarter (23.9%) and belief in sin by one-seventh (14.2%). All the other components 
of faith gain insignificant shares (from 9.1 down to 1.8%). Although this type encompasses 
the biggest group of respondents, it nevertheless still holds that in the population observed 
as a whole there is only a small share of 'pure' atheists who do not subscribe to one or 
another of the component beliefs. 
We have illustrated then how religiousness, expressed through the concept of god and 
church attendance affects the scope and depth of faith. It is more than clear that orthodox 
believers are at the same time dogmatic believers and that deviation from its basic religious 
teachings and premises is evident with increasing distance from the church. 
(b) Influence of socio-religious type on individual attitudes and values. 
A group of variables (V 152:- V 165) signifying the province of the church's work and 
influence in the contemporary world was included in the analysis. Factor analysis grouped 
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these variables into three factors: the first included the most prevalent problems or areas of 
decision which do not have a marked religious or ecclesiastic connotation but are nevertheless 
ruled upon by most contemporary churches. This is also the case with the Catholic Church. 
These areas are: disarmament, the problems of the third world, unemployment, race 
discrimination, and ecology and environmental issues. The second factor groups together 
aspects and problems that intersect with the precepts of the church, particularly the Catholic, 
and contemporary Western (west European) societies. It is significant for this group of issues 
that they directly concern the individual and his intimate life. The factor includes: attitudes 
towards abortion, extra-marital relations, euthanasia, homosexuality, and also government 
policies. Outside this a third independent factor was made up of responses to the question 
whether the Church (in Slovenia) responds adequately to: moral problems and the needs of 
the individual, family problems, the individual's spiritual needs, and social problems 
affecting the home country. 
TABLE 6: Socio-religious typology and issues on which the Church 
should take positions (in %) 
The Church should 
rule on: 
Total TYPE A TYPE B 
share Orthodox Tradit-
N=1035 ional-
Church 
TYPE C TYPE D Type E 
Religious Tradit- Unrel-
ional- igious 
Rel ig-
ious 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- disarmament 39.8 44.0 43.4 43.8 43.2 33.3 
- abortion 20.6 47.2 23.5 22.5 16.7 12.4 
- third world 32.5 45.6 35.3 28.8 39.8 24.5 
- extra-marital relations 18.3 45.6 19.1 26.3 12.9 10.3 
- un~loyment 37.0 41.6 41.9 33.8 44.7 29.4 
-
race discrimination 35.2 43.2 42.6 37.5 41.3 25.8 
- euthanasia 21.9 32.0 23.5 25.0 23.9 16.4 
- homosexuality 17.0 25.6 18.4 15.0 17.8 13.6 
- ecology 47.1 39.2 54.4 47.5 56.8 40.9 
- government policy 15.2 23.2 14.7 17.5 12.5 10.9 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1035) (125) (136) (80) (264) (330) 
Source: WS, Rl FSS, University of Ljubljana 
The results of the factor analysis are illustrated by the data in Table 6. The degree of 
concurrence regarding which personal or societal problems the church should take positions 
on was substantially lower, and the influence of the Church and its teachings on attitudes was 
not as marked, as in the case of the various components of belief. There were no substantial 
differences between the different socio-religious types with regard to attitudes towards the 
general problems of contemporary society and countries, such as disarmament, the third 
world, unemployment, race discrimination, and also ecology. A line of division was only 
found between the first four types (A,B,C,D) and type E. Respondents who are more or less 
intensively tied to religion and the Church consider that the Church should take positions on 
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these general social issues. The 'unreligious' do so with much less intensity. These are 
somehow not matters on which the Church should take positions. Nevertheless it may be 
stated that the proximity to faith and church does not have an marked sway on these at-
titudes. 
The second group includes those matters and issues that concern the individual's intimate 
life, his private world. These are: abortion, extra-marital relations, euthanasia, homsexuality. 
The data in Table 6 shows that attitudes on these issues are substantially determined by 
proximity to faith and the Church. Attitudes more congruent with Catholic doctrines are 
expressed by respondents that come within the 'orthodox' (type A) group, while the 
'traditional-church' and 'religious' types (B, C) deviate markedly from type A; an even more 
marked deviation is evident with the 'traditional-religious' type (D); the 'unreligious' take 
a negative stand in the great majority of cases. 
The Church's efforts to increase attendance at its services are quite understandable. This 
is seen from the correlation between orthodoxy and the acceptance of the basic tenets of the 
faith and also the attitude towards the social and moral role of religion and the church in the 
contemporary world. Of course this is far from asserting there is a causal relationship in this. 
The fact is however that those who identify with religious teachings and church precepts and 
those who adopt the Church's moral rules to a greater extent, also go to church and attend 
services. 
(c) Socio-demographic characteristics of the socio-religious types. 
Having found significant differences in the extent and intensity of faith and in the extent 
of the influence of Church teachings on the formation of attitudes towards a series of general 
human and intimate matters, it is of course interesting to see if this typology also functions 
in the socio-demographic context. For this purpose tests were made with respect to gender, 
age, and subjective ranking on a socio-economic status scale. 
Gender. Analysis showed that females are represented more strongly than males in types A, 
B, and D, while representation in type C was more even. Males were represented much more 
strongly in type E (unreligious)--40.4% compared with 30.9% of females. 
Age. The oldest age group was most strongly represented in type A, in which the incidence 
of youngest group was low (18-25 years of age, 8.8%; 65 years and over, 24.8%). The young 
compensated for their low incidence in the foregoing group in type B ('traditional-church': 
18-25 years of age--17%; 55-65 years--18%; the other groups range around 12%). In type 
C, 'religious', there is a clearly higher incidence of the oldest group, while the incidence of 
the first four age groups in type D, 'traditional-religious', is more marked (18-55 years: on 
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average around 33%, and that of the two oldest groups much lower (20.7%; 16.3%). The 
'unreligious' type E is almost evenly distributed over all age groups, with the 25-35 and 35-
45 years groups showing slightly higher incidence. 
Older people then are more 'orthodoxly religious' than younger. A lower degree of 
religiousness in general is shown by the 25-45 year groups, that is those in the midst of 
personal and professional ascent. The youngest (18-25 years) cluster most heavily in types B 
and D. This group accounts for 51.7% of the youngest and only 28.6% of the oldest (65 and 
over). However, although there is a clear relationship between age and religiousness, it is not 
possible to posit a directly correlated change in religiousness· with age. The relationship is 
much more complex and certainly requires more detailed analysis, as far as Slovenia is 
concerned. It is true that the young and the youngest are less devout than the older groups 
and that the oldest are the most devout. But it is also true that the youngest and the young 
groups are on average equally present in the religious and church space and that they 
perceive it more individually, more flexibly and more freely than as some 'belief and 
behavior pre-pack'. They are not disciplined worshippers, nor prepared to orthodoxly 
conform to church dogma. Finally, their incidence in the 'unreligious' type (E) is only 
slightly below average. If non-participation in religious se!vices means 'less' faith, perhaps 
this is because young people are the pillars of social development, social change, and revolt. 
Perhaps as they grow older they retreat in part to the space of unreligiousness, and in part 
become more 'disciplined' in the church and religion space and thus become more 'religious'. 
Since conclusions are often drawn about the secularization process on the basis of the growth 
of 'religiousness' with increasing age, Hout may be cited (1993) to illustrate this idea: church 
attendance, occasional or regular, increases with age in every group of people born in this 
century. This data strongly supports the hypothesis of a life cycle but not the hypothesis of 
secularization. The life cycle is so powerful, secularization so weak, that comparisons of 
different cohorts of the same age do not yield significant differences. This probably cannot 
be confirmed by empirical data from Slovenia which is characterized by a dynamic (up and 
down) de-secularization process due to various internal and external factors. 
Socio-economic status. We drew on the indicator of 'socio-economic status' which allocates 
respondents into four categories: (I): the upper, upper middle class; (2) middle class, non-
manual workers; (3): manual workers - skilled and semi-skilled; (4): manual workers -
unskilled, farm workers, unemployed, etc. It was found that degree of religiousness is 
directly proportionate to socio-economic status. This holds to a lesser degree for types Band 
C, but is reversed for type D in which the higher and middle classes are more strongly 
represented and the skilled/semi-skilled and unskilled less so. TypeD shows strong under-
representation of only the lowest class. It may be observed then that socio-economic status 
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determines the relationship to church and religion and is reflected in the intensity of 
religiousness and church attendance. The unreligious are (almost equally) distributed in the 
top three status categories which share the common characteristic that personal socio-
economic status is based on completion of at least secondary schooling. 
5. Conclusion. 
International comparisons have not been included in this short review and preliminary 
analysis of WVS Slovenia 1992. The summary results available for the Federal Republic of 
Germany (the former West Germany), Italy, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Austria--and the impressions gained from them--suggest that Slovenia 
ranks as rather 'normal' in its European space. This also emerged from comparison with ISSP, 
Religion 1991. 'Normal' here means that in terms of the distribution of responses in the 
religion section and in terms of its values, Slovenia ranks near or together with the 
Netherlands, Hungary, Federal Republic of Germany, etc. on the European values 
continuum. It is quite removed from the value samples and belief findings for Italy, Poland, 
i.e. countries with a marked Catholic cultural tradition. Unquestionably the system 
(Communist) and the prevailing ideology had a marked influence on faith and attitudes 
towards the church in Slovenia. This holds especially for the initial post-Second World War 
years, and the next 20 years. At that time the state, political power, and ideology went 
(repressively) hand-in-hand. The ideological monopoly even prevented empirical sociological 
research so that no sociological record is available for that time. Subsequently, and this is il-
lustrated by the data, personal value systems broke free of the system, and the power of 
ideological indoctrination declined strongly. 
In connection with the secularization thesis it may be observed that the secularization 
trend reversed in Slovenia in the Eighties. This is evident above all in the growth of 
unorthodox forms of religiousness. People feel freer in the religion and church space. 
Amongst the young in particular there is a rise in 'secularized religiousness' which is placed 
outside and does not acknowledge church institutions. This phenomenon is more closely 
linked to the dynamic pluralization of values in the West European space than to the 
Slovenian Church. Of course in Slovenia as well, the Church has not reacted appropriately 
to this course of events. 
The question whether the social revolution (1990) has directly impacted on the 
individual's religious sphere may, with some reservations, be answered negatively. Everything 
indicated by the results of research into religiousness in Slovenia following the revolution 
(ISSP, Religion 1991, WVS 1992) was present or evident as a trend in the Eighties. Of course 
the position of the church, church schools, the presence of the church in the mass media and 
of church dignitaries in public life, have all changed, and have been formally regulated in 
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the Constitution. The process of restitution of church property that had been expropriated 
after the war (forests, land, buildings, etc.) has been initiated. However the Church's social 
standing is not rising with its 'legalization' and the increase in its social power. The position 
of the Church and priests on the confidence scale is low, along with political parties, trade 
unions, government institutions, etc. Its return to the arena of social power in Slovenia does 
not give the Church any special advantages in exercising its spiritual role. 
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